A review essay on the human visual system can safely presuppose that there is such a system, with homologs in other species, and get on with describing what scientists have learned about how retinal images lead to detailed and informative representations of distal scenes. Discussions of the language faculty are more controversial from the outset. It is not obvious what the alleged faculty does, or whether its operations are specific to language. Indeed, it is not clear what language is, or what languages are. So at least initially, it is hard to say what would make a cognitive system specifically linguistic. Nonetheless, while other animals can communicate to some degree, children go though what seems to be a special kind of linguistic metamorphosis. So in this chapter, we focus on some remarkable facts about how children acquire languages, as a way of gaining insight in this domain. Our conclusion is that humans have a language faculty-a cognitive system that supports the acquisition and use of certain languages-with several core properties. This faculty is apparently governed by principles that are logically contingent, specific to human language, and innately determined. Moreover, at least some of these principles are grammatically pervasive. They are manifested in diverse constructions, and they unify linguistic phenomena that are superficially unrelated. 1 Every biologically normal child acquires thousands of words and a capacity to understand endlessly many complex expressions, given an ordinary and relatively brief course of experience.
The child seems to be sleeping (3) The child seems sleepy The asterisk indicates that there is something wrong with using (1) to express a thought. But this does not preclude understanding (1), which is not incomprehensible word salad like (4).
(4) *Be seems child to sleeping the Such examples challenge the idea that Naturahls can be described, in any theoretically interesting way, as E-languages. Since (1) is defective, the corresponding signal-interpretation pair is not an element of any set/E-language that is plausibly the set of English expressions. Yet when a child acquires English, the algorithm/procedure/I-language acquired associates the sound of (1) with an interpretation, though one that can be signaled "better" with (2) . This I-language may fail to determine any set/E-language that can be identified with English. So if the goal is to explain how children acquire Naturahls, and how adults can interpret the sounds of such languages, the theoretical descriptions should be in I-language terms. From this perspective, the human faculty for language is a biologically implemented device for acquiring I-languages.
Constrained Homophony
In what follows, we present several reasons for thinking there is such a faculty, implemented somehow in ways determined by the human genome and how it unfolds in embryology. We focus mainly on the fact that children acquire procedures that associate sounds with interpretations in ways that permit lots of ambiguity, while also imposing exacting limits on how ambiguous strings of words can be. In short, ambiguity is ubiquitous but highly constrained in Naturahls. To the extent that constraints on linguistic ambiguity are not due to other cognitive systems, these constraints can reveal features of the posited faculty. And specifically linguistic constraints on ambiguity are good candidates for innate specification, since it is so unlikely that children learn that word interpretations cannot be combined in ways that would yield more ambiguity than adults permit. To do what children do, given their experience, they need a faculty that projects I-languages in distinctive ways that are largely independent of experience.
To illustrate, let's begin with the string of words in (5). This string of words can be understood in either of the two ways indicated with (5a) and (5b).
(5) The man called the woman from Paris (5a) The man called the woman, and the woman was from Paris (5b) The man called the woman, and the call was from Paris
In this sense, (5) is a homophone like 'bank' or 'bear'. But (5) is homophonous even holding fixed the interpretations associated with the word-sounds. Here, the ambiguity is said to be structural, in that 'from Paris' can be understood as modifying the noun 'woman' or the verb (phrase) 'called (the woman)'. But the string of words in (5) cannot be understood in a third way.
(5c) #The man called the woman, and the man was from Paris Note that (5c) can be used to express a coherent thought, which could easily be constructed from concepts indicated with the words in (5), in a way that parallels an intuitive subject-predicate division: the man is an individual x such that x called the woman, and x is from Paris.
3 Yet the word-string in (5) cannot be have the interpretation of (5c). So (5) is two-but-not-three ways ambiguous. We can invent a language in which string (5) has all three readings, or just one. But acquiring English, as opposed to some such invented language, is a matter of acquiring a procedure that is permissive in treating (5) as ambiguous and yet restrictive in a specific way.
This point is pervasive. Given any string of words that has at least one interpretation (in some Naturahl), that string will be n-but-not-n+1 ways ambiguous, where n may be 0. Even unambiguous strings can be interesting, because pairs of superficially similar strings can be unambiguous in different ways. Borrowing a famous example from Chomsky, (6) can only be understood as in (6a), even though the relation of (6) to (6b) seems no less direct than the relation of (6) to (6a). By contrast, (7) can only be understood as in (7b).
(6) John is eager to please (7) John is easy to please (6a) John is eager that he please us (7a) #It is easy for John to please us (6b) #John is eager that we please him (7b) It is easy for us to please John
These observations invite the following suggestion: in both (6) and (7), 'please' takes a covert subject and a covert object; though because 'eager' and 'easy' differ semantically, 'eager' takes a (nonpleonastic) subject that is also understood as the subject of 'please', while 'easy' can take a pleonastic subject ('It') or a subject that is understood as the object of 'please'. Explaining these facts will require interacting assumptions about how 'eager' and 'easy' are related to the concepts they indicate, and how words can be combined in Naturahls. But whatever the details, it is hard to see how children could figure out what (6) and (7) cannot mean without help from a faculty that is largely responsible for these facts-which go unnoticed by most speakers, and which remain puzzling even for trained linguists with access to lots of data.
It is striking that speakers agree about many such unambiguities, once they are prompted to reflection. Repeatedly, and despite considerable variation in experience, children in Englishspeaking countries grow up to be adults for whom (6-7) are unambiguous in the particular ways that these strings are unambiguous for other competent speakers of English. One can speculate that this regularity of acquisition is, somehow, a by-product of a general learning mechanism applied to the sound-interpretation pairs that any normal child acquiring English will encounter.
But absent at least a sketch of a proposal, such speculations are implausible, given that Naturahls allow for lots of ambiguity. For it is hard to learn from experience that a string cannot have an additional (coherent and composable) interpretation.
Indeed, a string of words can have an interpretation that seems crazy, compared with an equally composable interpretation that the string cannot have. Consider (9), which must be understood as the bizarre question (10), as opposed to the more reasonable question (11).
(9) Was the boy who fed the waffles fed the horses?
(10) Yes-or-No: the boy who fed the waffles was fed the horses?
(11) #Yes-or-No: the boy who was fed the waffles fed the horses?
In (9), the auxiliary verb 'Was' is construed as related to 'fed' in the main clause, corresponding to the bizarre passive phrase 'was fed the horses' in (10)-as opposed to 'fed' in the relative clause, corresponding to the more expected passive 'was fed the waffles' in (11); compare (12).
(12) Was the boy who fed the horses fed the waffles?
Even if one knows that the boy fed the horses, and that he was fed the waffles, (9) remains perversely unambiguous. And this is not because Naturahls abhor ambiguity.
Still, one wants to know if "negative" facts concerning the absence of readings are restricted to the I-languages of adults. For if so, one might suspect that some kind of experiencedependent learning procedure-as opposed to an innate faculty largely responsible for linguistic metamorphoses in human children-plays a major explanatory role in accounting for the emergence of such facts in human languages. So it is important to know the ages at which children recognize various kinds of nonambiguity. And at least in many cases, children seem to be fully competent (adult-like) speakers in these respects by the age of three. If this is correct, it considerably narrows the window of opportunity for learning, thereby bolstering the case for an innate and substantive acquisition faculty. We end this section with one cluster of examples, though the literature contains many others.
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Young children know that pronouns like 'he' and 'him' can have deictic or anaphoric interpretations, and that pronouns like 'himself' must be understood as anaphoric. But more interestingly, they know that certain anaphoric interpretations are impossible. In (13), the antecedent of 'himself' must be 'Grover', and the antecedent of 'he' cannot be 'Grover'. These facts can be represented as in (14) In (16-17), the possibilities for 'him' and 'himself' reverse the possibilities in (14-15). Linguists can use such data to revise their theories. But it seems unlikely that all children who acquire English encounter and use such data in determining how pronouns can/cannot be understood.
Yet 3-year-olds know which interpretations are available for examples like (14) (15) (16) (17) . This suggests that children never consider superficially simpler algorithms for interpreting pronouns.
To be sure, young children cannot just report that a string of words fails to have a certain reading. But in suitably constructed experiments, their behavior reveals an I-language that is adult-like with regard to which interpretations are allowed and which are not allowed. By age three, children are adept at saying whether a puppet has correctly or incorrectly described a scenario that has just been played out. If the puppet uses an ambiguous string that is true on a salient reading, but false on another reading, children (like adults) say the puppet was right.
Other things equal, children say the puppet was wrong only when they understand the sentence as being false on each relevant reading. By constructing scenarios appropriately, one can have the puppet say something that is false on every interpretation available for adults but true on a logically possible interpretation that would be especially salient if it were available. If children consistently say the puppet is wrong in such cases, this is evidence that children do not assign the (20) 79% of the time. This strongly suggests that, by age 3, children already respect the relevant constraint on anaphoric relations.
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As we indicated at the outset, another property of the human faculty for language is its conformity to "deep" principles that unify phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be unrelated. For example, Chomsky (1981) faculty that plays two roles: first, it leads children to hear strings like (6-24) as structured expressions whose constituents exhibit such relations; and second, it treats these relations as semantically important, in a way that severely constrains how children can associate the syntactic 14 structures with interpretations. To the extent that domain general learning mechanisms fail to detect the abstract structural property of c-command, or fail to treat this property as interpretively relevant in the right ways, these mechanisms fail to provide a unified account of the various phenomena tied together by c-command and the corresponding facts about acquisition.
In which case, the conclusion invited is that the relevant structures and constraints are somehow imposed by a human faculty for language. Of course, this is only the start of an explanation. One wants to know how human biology implements such a faculty and what, exactly, is implemented. But ignorance on this score is no argument that the constraints are, despite evidence to the contrary, somehow acquired in response to experience. 
Patterns in patterns
We assume that the language faculty is not a mere hodgepodge of constraints that happen to be The transcripts of parental input suggest that children get little evidence that disjunction is inclusive. The vast majority of the input is consistent with an exclusive interpretation. So if this interpretation were possible, in human languages, many children should adopt it. Yet 2-yearolds have already concluded that the disjunction-word in English has the inclusive meaning of 'v'. This is already striking. Moreover, given this conclusion, children must treat 'or'-statements in unnegated contexts like (29) as having a more restrictive "secondary" interpretation:
. So they seem to be presupposing some kind of semantics/pragmatics distinction in their understanding of 'or'-statements. And they seem to presuppose that the core meaning for a disjunction-word is inclusive.
One can imagine a different linguistic scheme in which 'or' has the exclusive meaning of '°', and negated statements have a more restricted secondary meaning:
not(P ° Q) & not(P & Q).
A speaker of such a language would know that (30) fails to semantically entail that (just) kicking the dog is disallowed, while also knowing that an utterance of this sentence pragmatically implicates that each of the two actions is disallowed. But this isn't how English works. 9 Children know this: secondary implications are associated with unnegated (or more generally, not downwardly entailing) grammatical contexts. And this has wider implications.
For adult speakers of English, "Ted didn't order sushi or pasta" has a conjunctive entailment: Ted didn't order sushi, and Ted didn't order pasta. We doubt that children note such facts and use them to acquire English. But in any case, evidence of an inclusive meaning for disjunction-words seems to be even poorer in other languages. For example, adult speakers of Japanese do not judge (31) to have conjunctive entailment. Rather, adult speakers of Japanese hear (31) as the claim that Ted didn't order sushi or Ted didn't order pasta (not-S v not-P).
(31) Ted ga sushi ka pasuta o tanomanakatta.
Ted NOM sushi or past ACC order-NEG-PAST 'it's sushi or pasta that Ted did not order (but I don't know which)'
Yet in contrast to adults, Japanese-speaking children interpret disjunction in simple negative sentences as having conjunctive implications, like English-speakers (young and old). Using a Truth Value Judgment Task, Goro and Akiba (2004) tested thirty Japanese-speaking children (mean age 5;3) as well as a control group of Japanese-speaking adults. On a typical trial, subjects were asked to judge whether or not (31) was an accurate description of a situation in which Ted had eaten sushi but not pasta. Japanese-speaking adults uniformly accepted the target sentences, whereas the overwhelming majority of Japanese-speaking children consistently rejected them.
To repeat, Japanese-speaking children interpreted negated disjunctions as licensing conjunctive entailments, whereas local adults do not. This is further evidence that across languages, children understand disjunction-words inclusively, despite experience that invites exclusive interpretation.
This raises the question of why Japanese adults hear (31) as they do. But once again, we think the answer lies with nonobvious grammatical structure projected by the language faculty, as opposed to learning from experience. Adults understand (31) with the disjunction operator 'ka' having scope over the negation, despite surface appearances. In this respect, 'ka' in (31) is like 'some' in (32), on the reading which doesn't imply that Ted didn't eat any kangaroo.
(32) Ted didn't eat some kangaroo.
Possible Meaning: There is some kangaroo that Ted didn't eat
On the indicated reading, 'some' is a positive polarity item (PPI), interpreted as having scope over a negation in the same clause. 10 But negation in a higher clause still takes scope over a PPI.
In (33), the negation clearly has widest scope.
(33) You didn't convince me that Ted ate some kangaroo.
Mandatory Meaning: You didn't convince me that Ted ate any kangaroo.
So if the Japanese disjunction-word 'ka' is a positive polarity item (for adults), then 'ka' should generate a conjunctive entailment in sentences with negation in a higher clause, as in (34).
(34) Gen ga Ted ga sushi ka pasuta o tanomu no o minakatta
Gen NOM Ted NOM sushi or pasta ACC order-Prt Nmlzr ACC see-NEG-PAST (Prt: Present, Nmlzr: Nominalizer)
'Gen didn't see Ted order sushi or pasta'
And this is the case. In both Japanese and English (like all other languages, as far as we know), disjunction-words in the scope of negation generate conjunctive entailments. But as 'ka' reveals, this generalization can be obscured in the simple constructions that are likely sources of data for children.
The generalization may be "manifest" only in structurally complex examples like (34).
It is very unlikely, however, that children acquiring Japanese infer that 'ka' signifies inclusive disjunction based on exposure to sentences like (34). Such sentences are too exotic to ensure that every language learner is exposed to sufficiently many to guarantee convergence on the local adult grammar. So it seems that Japanese children understand 'ka' as inclusive disjunction, despite input from parents who treat 'ka' as a PPI in simple negative sentences. Human language acquisition is, for whatever reasons, constrained in this way. And this has cascading effects for other aspects of interpretation. In the next section, we develop this point to illustrate how appeal to an innate language faculty can help explain why apparently disparate phenomena are not acquired separately.
Related Generalizations
As noted by medieval logicians, quantificational expressions like 'every', 'some' and 'no'-which combine with a predicate like 'dog' to form a phrase that can combine with a predicate like 'barked' to form a sentence-can be characterized in terms of the inferences they license between pairs of predicates such that one is (known to be) more restrictive than the other.
Consider 'dog' and 'brown dog'. If some brown dog barked, then some dog barked. The direction of inference is from the more restrictive to the less restrictive predicate. Likewise, if some dog barked loudly, then some dog barked. The inference is from the more restrictive 'barked loudly' to the less restrictive 'barked'.
Replacing 'some' with 'no' inverts this pattern: if no dog barked, then no brown dog barked. Interestingly, 'every' is like 'no' with regard to the first predicate, and like 'some' with regard to the second predicate: if every dog barked, then every brown dog barked; and if every dog barked loudly, then every dog barked. So 'every' is said to be downward entailing in its first (nominal) argument position, while 'no' is downward entailing in both argument positions.
Children know such facts. 11 But even more interestingly, their acquisition of Naturahls respects correlations between other linguistic properties.
One phenomenon correlated with "downward entailingness" involves so-called negative polarity items like 'ever' and 'any.' Negative polarity items (NPIs) are licensed in downward entailing contexts, as illustrated in (35), with the first predicates in bold. We conclude this section with one last point about disjunction, and how its interpretation is related to c-command. The point is simple, theoretically, but striking from the perspective of acquisition, since it seems so unlikely that a child would ever "find" the generalization. As In a study of 5-year-olds, Gualmini and Crain (2005) had a puppet use sentences like (47) or (48), as a description of a story about two girls who had each lost a tooth.
(47) The girl who stayed up late did not get a dime or a jewel.
(48) The girl who did not go to bed got a dime or a jewel.
Disjunction resides in the scope of 'not' in (47) . But in (48), 'not' is embedded in a relative clause, and so fails to have scope over 'or'. This difference in structure results in a difference in 23 interpretation. For both adults and children, (47) has a conjunctive entailment, while (48) does not. In the story, one girl went to sleep, but one girl stayed up to see the tooth fairy. The girl who was asleep received both a dime and a jewel from the tooth fairy, but the girl who had stayed awake was only given a jewel. At the end of the story, 87% of children presented with (47) accepted the sentence. By contrast, 92% of children presented with (48) rejected the sentence, on the grounds that the girl who stayed up late had only received a jewel.
For these children, (47) has a conjunctive entailment. This requires sensitivity to the fact in (47), 'not' c-commands 'or', which signals inclusive disjunction. This is a lot to learn, all at once. But such facts are unsurprising if children have a language faculty that leaves them with no other interpretive options. But if children are born able to adopt other linguistic options, and must somehow learn that these options happen not to be exploited in English, then the rapid convergence on adult grammar is very surprising indeed.
Limited Variation
Given a human faculty for language, one expects many aspects of adult grammar to be determined independent of experience and manifested at an early age. From a theorerical perspective, innate linguistic principles define a space of possible human languages: a space the child explores, influenced by her environment, until she stabilizes on a grammar equivalent to that of adults in her linguistic community. Languages outsisde this space will go "untried."
But correlatively, at any stage of acquisition, children are employing a possible state of the language faculty (a possible I-language), just not the one being used by local adults. So even if the known adult grammars constitute only some of the possible human grammars, one expects to find children trying out grammars with features found in adult languages elsewhere on the globe.
If this expectation is confirmed, it provides dramatic support for a human language faculty that determines the linguistic options available to children. We conclude this chapter by briefly noting an example of children acquiring an I-language that diverges from those of local adults.
For even if such cases are in some sense unusual, they provide vivid evidence of children projecting I-language in accordance with constraints imposed by their language faculty and in the absence of relevant experience.
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Using an elicited production task, Thornton (1990) This suggests that the children in question have an I-language that lets them form questions with a "medial wh-word" subject to a constraint. And this suggestion is bolstered by the fact that many adults have such an I-language. For example, (52) The contrasts in (52-54) raise questions about how children who acquire medial-wh languages figure out when not to use a medial wh-expression. But even if children could learn the relevant constraints, given experience with those who use a medial-wh language, it seems impossible for children to learn a constraint on a construction that does not exist in the local adult language.
Instead, it seems that language faculty makes it possible to acquire an I-language that permits questions with a medial-wh, even if one does not encounter such questions. Yet whatever I-language one acquires, that way of associating signals with interpretations is subject to whatever constraints the language faculty imposes on these procedures. And for whatever reason, expressions like (50-51) and (53) are verboten. From this perspective, it is not surprising that
when American children use a medial-wh, they are governed by the same constraints as Bavarian children. But if one does not assume that children everywhere are projecting I-languages in accordance with constraints imposed a distinctive faculty, it is quite surprising that children who use (49) don't use (50) or (51), even when prompted to do so. For further examples, see Thornton (1996) , Crain and Thornton (1998), Crain, Gualmini and Pietroski (2005) .
Conclusion
We have tried to illustrate, with examples that may have some independent interest for philosophers, that humans have a faculty for acquiring procedures (I-languages) that associate linguistic signals with interpretations in constrained ways; where these constraints are not reflections of more general constraints on thought and/or the experience that leads children to acquire a particular procedure. The constraints, which are at far remove from ordinary perception, govern superficially disparate constructions. And yet they are respected by young children. As Chomsky and many others have long argued, this suggests that language acquisition is made possible by a distinctive human faculty for generating I-languages.
4. See, e.g., Crain (1991); Crain and Pietroski (2001, 2002) ; Crain and Thornton (1998 Thornton ( , 2006 Guasti (2002); Goodluck (1991); Pietroski and Crain (2005) . 5 In experiments of this kind, children almost never reject sentences 100% of time. A "noise" rate of about 10% is standard and hardly surprising. When children are confused by a question, they are more likely to say 'yes' than 'no'. Thus, 90% rejection is very good evidence that children understand the puppet's claim as wrong on any salient reading. 6 Much discussed "poverty of stimulus arguments"-for recent reviews, see Crain and Pietroski (2001) , Laurence and Margolis (2001) , and the replies to Pullum and Scholz (2002)-can reveal that the facts to be explained have their source in a substantive language faculty, whose nature remains unclear, as opposed to general learning mechanisms whose nature remains unclear.
7. In terms of the evolutionary time scale and underlying biology, the difference between humans and our nearest primate cousins is small. So somehow, a small and recent change had dramatic effects; see Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) , Hornstein and Pietroski (forthcoming).
8 If one starts with concept of inclusive disjunction, constructing a concept of inclusive disjunction to associate with 'or' would not be hard, compared with children's other cognitive accomplishments. And even if exclusive interpretations are implicatures, they must represented somehow, raising the question of children don't associate directly/semantically associate such representations with 'or'. See Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000) for introductory discussion that bridges Grice (1975) to relevant literature in linguistics.
